

DD/M&S 73-3642

12 SEP 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CIA Management  
Committee

SUBJECT : Proposed Topics for Unclassified  
Histories

1. The Chief, CIA Historical Staff has proposed that unclassified histories be written on the topics described in the attachment.

2. I suggest we discuss the proposal at a Management Committee meeting after members have had an opportunity to review and discuss the topics with their staffs.

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


HAROLD L. BROWNMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

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PROPOSED TOPICS FOR UNCLASSIFIED HISTORIES

General Title for Series:

The Central Intelligence Agency: An Arm of

National Security Policy

1) The Battle for Iran

In the immediate post World War II era, the USSR attempted to secure a dominant role in Iran, rich in oil reserves. The US government decided to help Iran resist the Communist takeover

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Work Plan:

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This history would require the services of a full-time writer, with some research assistance, and would require an estimated six

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months' work. [REDACTED]

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2) A Communist Beach-head in Latin America

The first attempt to establish a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere occurred in 1954 in Guatemala. The US government decided that the Arbenz regime, which had material support from the Soviet Bloc, was unacceptable from a standpoint of national

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security. [REDACTED]

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Work plan:

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[REDACTED] there is evidently no compilation which could serve as the base of a completed history, classified or unclassified. Project files are available; the key officers, active and retired, are scattered.

This history would require the services of a full-time writer, with some research assistance, and would require an estimated nine months to complete.

3) The Communist Bid in Africa

Beginning in 1960 with the emergence of many newly-independent nations, the Communist Bloc made a strong effort to capture the allegiance of the new nations or to deny their adherence to the Free World cause. A major skirmish in this conflict took place in the

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Congo.

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The Communists were denied control of the Congo, and their influence was weakened throughout the Continent.

Work plan:

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Files and key officers are available.

An unclassified history would require a full-time writer with some research assistance, and would require an estimated four months' work.


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
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This is a major undertaking which would require at least two full-time writers, a small research staff, and could take up to three years to complete.

5) The US Involvement in Vietnam

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CIA was involved in wide-ranging activities in Vietnam and Indochina and will probably continue to be for the foreseeable future. An accurate account of CIA's role is essential to a fair history of this US national security activity.

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Work Plan:

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A full-time writer is researching and writing. It will take him at least two years. He will probably need some research assistance to handle the analytical side of the question.

6) The War in Laos

CIA has carried a major burden in the US government's efforts to establish and maintain a neutral, independent Laos and to control the Communist use of Laos in the war in Vietnam.

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Work Plan:

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This project would require the services of one full-time writer with research assistance and would take an estimated one year.

(Note: CIA was one of the first to recognize the Indo-China situation as an integrated problem.

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The Agency's perception deserves special treatment.)

7) The U-2

The development and use of this collection device by CIA is a classic example of:

- (1) CIA's response to priority national security requirements
- (2) CIA's ability to procure, deploy, and operate in secrecy
- (3) CIA's ability to coordinate the needs of the intelligence community and to balance requirements against the collection capability
- (4) CIA's ability to establish a national facility to make efficient use of the product.

The U-2 program led directly to follow-on efforts, especially the reconnaissance satellites.


This project covers a remarkable response by the Agency with full cooperation from private industry and governmental agencies to an urgent need for information on Soviet military programs.

Work Plan:

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The major task will be to conduct carefully-structured interviews with leading personalities, such as Dick Bissell,   
Art Lundahl, Jim Cunningham, and others. This should give this history

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the human drama it requires.

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Although

the basic research has been completed, it is estimated that a full-time writer would be required for at least six months.

8) Analysis of Communist Intentions and Capabilities

The end result of the Agency's activities is to present the President and his principal advisers with the best possible estimate of foreign reactions to US interests and courses of action. As leader of the intelligence community and on its own, CIA analysts are responsible for seeing that all data and judgments are weighed.

On several major issues (the Soviet capability for long-range attack, Communist efforts to subvert Latin America, Communist intentions in Southeast Asia), the collection and evaluation efforts have been dovetailed to support US security objectives.

A history of analysis is vital to a balanced presentation of CIA's primary mission. It has been a major theme in official statements, public and private, by the Directors of Central Intelligence.

Work Plan:

There are fragmentary references in various histories, but they are just that. After the key issues have been identified, a full-time researcher would spend an estimated one year collating his material and another nine months writing. This project calls

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
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for an author with considerable substantive depth.

9) The Communist Role in Cuba

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The total Agency involvement



encompasses the US effort to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime, the Soviet effort to establish a missile base, and Cuban efforts to export their revolution.

A balanced presentation would treat the Agency's failures and successes with candor. This history would serve to illustrate the changing conditions under which the US Government conducted its foreign policy and these changes as reflected in the Agency's responsibilities and activities.

Work Plan:

The present plan is that the current work on the Bay of Pigs will lead the writer to broaden his vision.

There are vast quantities of both raw research material and finished studies on various aspects of the Cuban story.


An estimated nine months of research would be followed by one year's writing.

10) Supporting the Cold War

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In every Agency covert activity, there is a saga


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Work Plan:

Once the issue is chosen, a full-time writer would require some six months to research and another six months for writing.

(Note: This ain't no soft soap for the DD/M&S. I have received, on behalf of various DCI's, as much support as anyone in the Agency, and have long admired the accomplishments, including support's enormous ability to hide its light under a bushel.)

11) The Covert Cold War in Europe

When the Communists clanged down the Iron Curtain, they also began to try to gain control of Western Europe through subversion. The Agency was assigned a key role in blunting this new kind of aggression

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


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Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

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Work Plan:

Remarkably little work has been done, except for the post-Katzenbach post-mortem. The files are available, but the officers are scattered, especially with the dissolution of CA Staff.


It would take a substantively-qualified researcher one year to round up the material, and another year to write a balanced evaluation.

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12) Technical Intelligence

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This is an area which Mr. Dulles described as taking all the fun out of intelligence. It has also taken a huge bite out of the taxpayers' pocket, and has crept into a major role in our collection and analysis.

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13) Before CIA

At some point, there has to be an authoritative account of how US intelligence grew from bits and pieces into the DCI-CIA-community complex. Actually, [ ] of OTR has been writing for some time on OSS; his terms of reference could be expanded.

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Work Plan:

This need not be a priority task, nor a major chore. It is worth noting that several people have tackled the OSS story and failed for reasons that are obscure.

14) The Intelligence Community

What it is, how it got that way, and how it works.

Using the completed histories of Smith, Dulles, and McCone, an account of the community from the viewpoint of important national security issues would be most useful in illustrating the connections

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between policy and intelligence.

Work Plan:

It ought not take a distinguished intellectual who can write more than one year to produce this piece.


15) The Reconnaissance Satellite

The development of this collection tool is, like the U-2, a remarkable saga of ingenuity, imagination, and security.

Work Plan:

DD/S&T has proposed that the retiring project manager of

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 submit a summary outline of the project.

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23-5332

10 SEP 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Executive Secretary

FROM : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Management Committee Item - Definition of  
Vital Records

1. Action Requested: A restatement or reaffirmation of the present Agency policy toward Vital Records is required.

2. Background: This Agency operates a Vital Records program as required by Executive Order 10346. This Executive Order was issued in April 1952 during the apprehensive days of the cold war when the possibility of nuclear confrontation was considered omnipresent. The Executive Order contemplated a Vital Records program

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] With the passage of time and the change in the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the perceived need for such a relocation site has diminished. At the same time, the Vital Records program carried out by the various components of this Agency has eroded. The components see little reason for expending the effort and manpower necessary to maintain a current Vital Records program in anticipation of a nuclear holocaust which may never occur. This unconscious decision may well be valid, but it does leave the Agency in an indeterminate position relative to a Vital Records program.

There is a requirement for Vital Records for reasons other than nuclear war. The Headquarters Building may be destroyed by fire; conceivably, we might even have an earthquake that could demolish us. Without elaborating on all disasters that could befall us, it would seem wise to redefine a Vital Records program and re-establish it as a dynamic concern in order to permit the Agency to carry on its functions in the event that such a disaster should occur.

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3. Action Recommended: The publication of a Headquarters Notice (attached), followed by a rewrite of the Headquarters Regulation redefining the Vital Records program as one which is necessary to enable the Agency to continue to execute its mission and functions in the event of inability to use the Headquarters records for any reason.

/s/ Harold L. Brownman

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

Attachment: a/s

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig. - Ret. to C/ISAS  
11 - CIA MC  
2 - DD/M&S  
1 - DDCI

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RECORDS AND CORRESPONDENCE

## VITAL RECORDS PROGRAM

1. In October 1969 President Nixon issued Executive Order 11490 which revoked Executive Order 10346 and reaffirmed the Federal Government's position which requires that each Federal agency must be able to perform its essential functions during any emergency. Whereas the earlier order addressed itself to civil defense emergency plans, its successor is more comprehensive and includes emergencies arising not only from warfare but fire, theft, sabotage, flood, or any other disaster.

2. Executive Order 11490 specifically requires that each agency establish a program for the safekeeping of essential records. Since  
STAT this program is administered on a decentralized basis

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3. To ensure that the Agency will be able to operate during and after an emergency, it is essential that each operating component identify those records that are essential to it on a continuing basis and which, if destroyed, would constitute an irreplaceable loss. Once identified, copies of these vital records should be scheduled for transfer to the Agency repository for safekeeping and routinely replaced when updated versions are issued.

4. The DDM&S/ISAS/Records Administration Branch is available to advise offices on all matters pertaining to vital records.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

HAROLD L. BROWMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

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23-1209/2

24 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management  
and Services  
Acting Deputy to the Director of Central  
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community  
SUBJECT : Bigot Lists

1. Action Required: This memorandum responds to your request for a paper to be discussed with the Management Committee for implementing a community-wide Bigot List System.

2. Basic Considerations: The following basic considerations were set forth on 15 August 1973 in a "Task" paper to the Office of Security from Mr. Ben C. Evans, Jr., Executive Secretary.

(a) Components of the Agency and intelligence community would identify particularly sensitive projects or activities.

(b) Bigot Lists would be prepared by name and organizational identification of individuals privy to the project or activity.

(c) The Director of Security as Chairman of the USIB Security Committee would implement the Bigot List System but will first prepare a basic paper on the dimensions of the work and of the problems involved in implementing the above. The paper is to be discussed at a Management Committee meeting.

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3. Staff Position:

(a) The Office of Security believes the concept of a Bigot List System is feasible and that with the proper guidance the system can be implemented.

(b) The Office of Security is of the opinion that the Office of Security rather than the USIB Security Committee is better experienced in this area and should be tasked with maintaining the Bigot Lists.

(c) The Office of Security has prepared and attaches the desired report on dimensions of the work and problems in implementation of this concept.

(d) While in the long run the computer may provide the most economical and efficient means, we are of the opinion that the effort should be initiated on a manual basis. If the lists grow too numerous or too lengthy then a simple computer program can be explored. If at a later date a more complex and complete "on-line" update and retrieval computer system is indicated then we could move into a system similar to the current Special Clearance (SPECLE) System maintained by the Office of Security.

(e) This position has been discussed with the Intelligence Community Staff and they agree with this approach.

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that this memorandum with its attachment be referred to the Management Committee as a basis for discussion of a community-wide Bigot List concept.

[Redacted Signature]

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Acting Director of Security

Attachment

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24 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report on Dimensions of Work and  
Problems Involved in Implementing  
A Bigot List Procedure

1. This paper reports on the dimensions of the work and problems involved in implementing a community-wide Bigot List System.

2. Assessing the feasibility of a community-wide Bigot List System, and the work load which such would entail, requires definition of the scope of the program and the intended allocation of responsibilities for its operation. The following are presented as the basis on which the Office of Security approached the problem.

(a) Basis for Inclusion.

Definition of a "particularly sensitive project or activity" is subject to interpretation. The originator of the project or official responsible for its security should be permitted to use his judgment and nominate them to the DCI. The DCI, however, should make the final selection. Pending a test run, there is little basis on which to estimate how many projects or activities might be selected for inclusion. For computation purposes we assumed that there might be twelve agencies or special program offices each of which might submit 25 Bigot Lists with as many as 100 names on each list.

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(b) Completeness.

It is assumed that the DCI intends that the set of lists include all projects or activities which the responsible officials consider are particularly sensitive. In CIA, for instance, this would include the DDO as well as the other Directorates. In Defense it would include the military services as well as the DIA, NSA and special program offices.

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(d) Size of Individual Lists.

It is assumed that "particularly sensitive" matters are those to which access is limited to a small number of persons, not exceeding 100 individuals although it is realized that some activities could require that more people be given access.

(e) Update.

The duration of need for the list as well as the frequency of updating it are factors which bear on the problem of maintenance. It is assumed that the need for each list would be renewed on an intermittent basis. There may be need to add names to the list but we see no need to delete identities since this would defeat the purpose of knowing who had access. Update

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(addition of names) would be performed every month by the originating office and the re-validation of the continuing need to have the project on a Bigot List should be done by them every four months.

(f) Responsibility for Maintenance of the List.

Four possibilities were examined:

(1) Sponsoring agencies could maintain the lists of their own sensitive projects. This concept negates the goal of a centralized location where all such material would be rapidly available.

(2) CIA could maintain a master list of only titles of the Bigot Lists, not identities. Responsible officers in each agency would maintain their own Bigot Lists of individuals with access. Again this fails to satisfy the objective for a central location for all identities approved for access to each list.

(3) The USIB Security Committee can maintain the lists. It is noted that the USIB Security Committee has no staff capability to discharge this responsibility and has had no experience in such activity.

(4) The Office of Security, CIA can maintain the lists. The Office of Security has had experience in maintaining lists of formal compartmented clearances and currently handles for CIA and the community over 45 compartmented projects or Bigot Lists with  individuals listed on them.

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(g) Content of Each List.

The amount of information maintained in each list will have a major impact on the

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administrative cost of its maintenance. It is assumed that each Bigot List will include the name and office or organizational identification of each person on the list. Addition of social security number and the title of each person is feasible but would add considerably to the cost of establishing and maintaining each list if done by computer. There would be minimum costs if this information were included on a manual system.

(h) Costs.

Costs for four alternative means of controlling the Bigot List System were projected. All costs were predicated on the assumption that there might be as many as 12 agencies which would submit lists. Each agency might submit as many as 25 lists. Each list might contain as many as 100 names. Costs are expressed in "ball park" figures since we could not address the unknown figures of frequency of reporting, number of copies of reports and duration of maintenance of the lists.

(1) A completely manual system was considered. This system would require departments and agencies to submit approved lists to the Office of Security, CIA. Updating and re-validation would be left to the originator on a schedule to be determined by the originator. The Office of Security would retain these lists and thus be in a position to provide the Director with a facility for a central location of all lists and all names approved for access as reported by the originator. While this procedure might be handled by the Office of Security, some experience will have to be acquired to assess the dimensions of the effort. It might require a modest increase in personnel or assets.

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25X1 (2) A total Bigot List System controlled by CIA using IBM cards in a "batch mode" computer process was considered. This would require each originating department and agency to submit to CIA its list of individuals on pre-punched IBM cards. CIA would in turn provide weekly or monthly printouts. Such a system would involve a one-time developmental [redacted] and an annual production [redacted]. It is estimated that two additional system operators would be required.

25X1 (3) The possibility of adding to the Office of Security's current SPECLE program was considered. We were informed that SPECLE could accommodate only eight additional Bigot Lists without a significant redesign cost. Adding eight Bigot Lists to the SPECLE System would not involve any developmental cost but would cost [redacted] for maintenance and reports. No additional personnel would be necessary.

25X1 (4) A total system similar to SPECLE but dedicated to maintaining Bigot Lists for the community was considered. Such a system would permit "on-line" update and retrieval. It would involve a one-time development [redacted] and an annual production [redacted]. This system would require in addition two key punch operators and two system operators.

3. Recommendations: The following recommendations are offered by the Office of Security in implementing a community-wide Bigot List System.

(a) The originator of the project or official responsible for the security should nominate to the DCI sensitive projects or operations for Bigot List protection. The DCI should make final approval of these lists.

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(c) The Office of Security, CIA should be tasked for initially maintaining the Bigot List System on a manual basis until the scope of the effort has been identified in a trial run. The Office of Security is then to make further recommendations as to how maintenance can most effectively and efficiently be accomplished.

(d) This report be provided to the CIA Management Committee as a basis for discussion of the DCI's Bigot List proposal.

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Acting Director of Security

Distribution:

Orig - Return to OS  
1 - ER  
1 - AD/DCI/IC Staff  
2 - DD/M&S  
11 - ES for MC

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19 SEP 1973

73-5872

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Executive Secretary, CIA Management  
Committee

FROM : Deputy Director for Management  
and Services

SUBJECT : Proposal for Declassification and  
Release of Selected Agency Publications  
and Histories

1. Action Requested: It is requested that you approve a plan to increase the amount of information made available to the public. The plan outlined below represents an effort to meet two objectives which, on the surface, may appear to be mutually contradictory--i.e., to be more forthcoming in releasing information and, at the same time, to protect intelligence sources and methods. Inasmuch as the plan constitutes an initial attempt to formulate a program along these lines, it should be regarded as tentative in nature and subject to modification as experience is gained.

2. Background: You have advised the Congress of your intent that the Agency be responsive to the public's right to be informed, while, at the same time, vigilant in the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The clear requirement to protect sources and methods severely limits Agency options in releasing information and dictates a conservative approach; information once released cannot be recalled, and it is imperative that nothing be done to cause sources to lose confidence in the Agency's discretion. For this reason, operational traffic, other

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ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

correspondence, plans, raw information reports, and documents incorporating data from sensitive collection systems have been eliminated from consideration. Further, it is not proposed to include estimative intelligence products in this program. The Agency's finished intelligence publications remain, and it is these which would probably hold the most interest for the general public. In addition to the various series of Agency publications, Agency histories, particularly those which chronicle the Agency's role in connection with specific events, would also be of interest and value to the American public. The proposal, therefore, calls for the establishment of a program for the release to the public in unclassified form of selected Agency finished intelligence publications and episodic histories. Separate plans are advanced for the two types of documents.

The plan for releasing finished intelligence publications calls for each production office to conduct a systematic review of its products in order to identify publications appropriate for release. The prime criterion for release would be the impact of such an action upon national security. If it is determined that this test is met, other criteria would come into play: potential public interest; timeliness of the information; quality of the product; whether clearances from other agencies would be required; etc. It can be assumed that the number chosen for release will be very limited. It is proposed that each production component review at the end of each calendar year all publications which it produced over the preceding five-year period. To the extent that the producing office can at the time of publication fix a definite date or event for the declassification of the report, the review task will be simplified. Those publications which in the judgment of the originating office can be declassified and are otherwise suitable for public release shall be forwarded to the Chief of the Information Systems Analysis Staff by 31 January of each year, and he shall be responsible for arranging for their review by the CIA Information Review Committee. For those publications in which the Committee concurs in their release, the documents shall be reprinted with a new cover, all classification markings and coordination statements having been deleted. If the author is overt and he so desires, he shall be identified and, if appropriate, a few of his scholarly credentials noted. Subject to the approval of his office, the originating component shall also be cited. The version thus sanitized shall be released through the Document

Expediting (DOCEX) Project of the Library of Congress, a channel which the Agency now utilizes for the release and distribution of selected unclassified reference aids.

The plan for the preparation and release of unclassified episodic histories is patterned after a technique successfully employed by the Historical Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. As applied to the Agency, it would entail having an Agency historian collect all pertinent documents and write an all-source history. The history would be coordinated like all other Agency histories. On the basis of this all-source history, the same Agency historian, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Historical Staff and subject to the concurrence of the CIA Information Review Committee, would then prepare an unclassified version, with all pertinent documents. The two versions with their documentation would then be submitted to a panel of historical consultants composed of five to seven professional historians of "recognized competence" who had been fully cleared for Agency employment. This panel would render an opinion on the value and accuracy of the unclassified version. Consideration would be given for the inclusion of minority dissents or caveats in the unclassified version, provided, of course, that such measures did not disclose sources or methods appearing in the classified version. If the panel so recommended, the history would then be reproduced in the requisite number of copies and distributed through the facilities of DOCEX. No histories currently available should be considered for declassification and release at this time. The preparation of unclassified versions, however, should be considered for histories now in the process of compilation or programmed for future production.

Obviously, both the unclassified histories and the declassified finished intelligence products could be made available to Congressional watchdog committees and/or deposited in the National Archives simultaneously with their release through DOCEX.

3. Staff Position:

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4. Recommendation: That approval be given to a plan calling for the systematic review, effective January 1974, of intelligence publications for the purpose of possible declassification and release through DOCEX, such plan to be incorporated into Agency regulations; and that approval also be given to a plan for the preparation of unclassified Agency histories and their publication and release through DOCEX, subject to the recommendation of a panel of historical consultants and approval by the CIA Information Review Committee, such plan also to be incorporated into Agency regulations.

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig - Ret to ISAS

- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - C/Historical Staff
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- 11 - MC

20 SEP 1973

Executive Registry

73-5923

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee

FROM : Deputy Director for Management  
and Services

SUBJECT : Timing of Honor and Merit Awards

1. Action Requested: That the Management Committee review the matter of the timing of honor and merit award recommendations and awards to be given to retirees.

2. Basic Data or Background: The large number of honor and merit awards submitted for employees who retired by 30 June 1973 brought a special problem into clearer focus. What was experienced were many cases of employees whose meaningful, productive, and often outstanding long-term Agency careers had never before been formally recognized. Only at the last moment, occasioned by retirement, were these employees finally considered for some type of award.

3. Staff Position: It appears to me that a delay in awards defeats the purpose for which the Agency's awards program exists and, to a degree, establishes an attitude that signals awards are associated with retirement and are not a means of giving timely recognition to outstanding accomplishments or performance.

I suggest that the Management Committee review this matter. As a contribution toward discussion, I have set forth below some ideas which could bring the awards program closer to its intended purpose.

a. We should encourage, by Agency notice, all supervisors to submit award recommendations in a time frame current with the achievement or performance for which recognition should be granted.

b. We should stop the practice of awarding the Intelligence Medal of Merit or the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to retirees, except in unusual situations. Such cases after being reviewed by the Honor and Merit Awards Board could be submitted to the Management Committee to decide whether an exception

to the general policy should be made. Recognizing the need for some transition time and also to avoid injustices to employees now close to retirement, I propose an effective date of 1 April 1974 to institute this new policy.

c. The Career Intelligence Medal, the Certificate of Distinction, and the Certificate of Merit should be the only awards normally approved for retirees.

I believe that these changes will make our awards program a more meaningful one since they are aimed first at giving deserving employees awards on a timely basis, and secondly to establish the Career Intelligence Medal and the Certificates as a retirement norm.

4. Recommendation: That the Management Committee review the matter of timing of recommendations for honor and merit awards, as described above, and the type of awards to be granted to retiring employees.

/s/ Harold L. Brownman

HAROLD L. BROWNMEN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

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Executive Registry
73-5932

DD/M&S 73-3758

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CIA Management Committee

FROM : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Incentive Awards for Employees Earning Bachelor and Advanced Degrees

1. Action Requested: Approve the awarding of a Quality Step Increase (QSI) to an employee earning a bachelor or advanced degree, principally on the employee's own time.

2. Background: The superior overall intellectual quality of Agency employees together with the value to the intelligence profession of expertise gained from formal education suggests that incentive awards would encourage further academic achievements by Agency personnel. Use of a QSI for such a purpose would be a tangible and continuing form of recognition to an employee with the initiative to improve his or her professional qualifications. Although the Agency does sponsor some employees for full-time academic training, paying all costs including salaries, it is neither practical nor economically feasible to do this on other than a very selective basis. Consequently, a supplementary program supported by the incentive of a QSI should challenge some employees who otherwise would not improve their academic standing.

3. Staff Position: The anticipated minute increase in average grade resulting from this proposed program would be a simple and inexpensive way to benefit both the Agency and the employee. Specific guidelines as to eligibility of employees and other governing criteria are now being studied; however, no unusual obstacles are evident that would delay early implementation of the program.

4. Recommendation: Approve in principle the concept of awarding Quality Step Increases to employees earning bachelor or advanced degrees, principally on their own time.

HAROLD L. BROWMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

APPROVED : \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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DD/M&S 73-3730  
20 SEP 1973

73-5417

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Annual Homecoming

Bill:

I have discussed your suggestion for an annual homecoming or "old-timer" day with the Directors of Personnel and Security. We believe the event could be successfully and securely staged, although there are some important factors to consider and resolve before making a final decision.

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The number of retirees attending a single event should not exceed [ ] capacity of the auditorium. I suggest that we can logically have this number by inviting former employees who retired during FY'70, FY'71 and FY'72 and still reside in the Washington area. Approximately one-half of [ ] retirees during these three fiscal years still have mailing addresses in this vicinity. Therefore, I believe we could [ ] acceptances out of [ ] invitations. I would not include FY'73 retirees until next year.

If the trial run of the homecoming achieves the desired results, then consideration can be given to having additional sessions and inviting retirees living outside the area.

✓ We should require an acceptance to an invitation in sufficient time to do a current name check and to insure proper identification of the retiree when he arrives. I should think that two to three weeks lead time would be adequate to handle the security and all other arrangements. ✓ This would mean that invitations should be mailed four to five weeks before the homecoming is scheduled.

✓ Having said the above and being prepared to implement it, I must question the advisability of expending personnel resources and money on preparations for an "old-timer" day. Although the event would undoubtedly be appreciated by the retirees, I have difficulty rationalizing any gains for the Agency and the taxpayer, particularly in this period of restricted budgets and personnel reductions. Therefore, I suggest that the proposal merits further discussion before you make a final decision.

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[ ]  
Harold L. Brownman

cc: DDCI

MCA-63

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Executive Registry

73-5962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Unit Citation

1. Action Requested: That you approve the concept of a unit citation.

2. Basic Data or Background: The Agency's awards program does not now include an Agency-level mechanism for recognizing bodies or groups of employees whose collective performance or contribution is of special significance. The matter of a unit citation was discussed some years ago but was not approved because of divided views among the Deputies. It is believed that the time has come to reconsider the question.

3. Staff Position: In the Office of Personnel we have already initiated individual recognition in the form of Quality Step Increases for those employees who worked so diligently and well on the flood of retirements which occurred prior to 30 June. In my judgment, something more is needed to mark the work of the units involved. Obviously, a unit citation would be a perfect solution for this specific situation and others like it elsewhere in the Agency.

You will recall that during your meeting with the members of the Honor and Merit Awards Board I sought informally your views on the matter of a unit citation. At that time you indicated you were in favor of such an award to recognize the contributions of a group of employees, an entire component of a station or base, etc., but added that those employees who had made a particularly important contribution to an effort meriting a unit citation should, in addition, be recommended for a specific award.

I am in no way suggesting that the unit citation be used in lieu of individual awards or other forms of recognition. As in my own instances, individuals should be recognized when such recognition has been earned and is due. What the unit citation does, however, is to allow a supervisor to go that one step beyond and also commend the collective performance of a group of employees when appropriate.

If the concept of a unit citation is approved, we would suggest using the same procedures in effect for the processing of existing awards. We will, of course, develop appropriate regulatory changes for review.

4. Recommendation: That you approve the addition of a unit citation to the Agency's awards program.

[Redacted Signature Box]

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John F. Blake  
Director of Personnel

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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Series B, Copy 7  
1 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

THRU: Deputy Director for Management and Services *Lee*

SUBJECT: NPIC Procurement of UNIVAC 1110 Multiprocessor System

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI thru ES/MC and DDS&T fr D/NPIC, dtd 1 Aug 73, subj: Request for Approval of NPIC Plan for Computer Support for 1975-1980

1. The Chief of my Information Processing Staff has done some 5-1/2 pages of pros, cons and considerations which boil down to the fact that the UNIVAC 1110 can do the required job, but so could the IBM 158. The main question he poses is: how important is compatibility with Headquarters IBM systems (and, by extension, the future [redacted] [redacted] Not insignificant in top management deliberation of the attached is its increased price tag of about [redacted]

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2. AD/OJCS concludes (Tab A) that the NPIC plan is technically sound. He notes that compatibility is a management issue and that acquisition of a UNIVAC 1110 would further isolate NPIC from the rest of the computing "community" in CIA. He concludes that the NPIC request should be approved, but that NPIC should re-study their need for dual processors and [redacted] terminals, the former significantly increasing costs and the latter posing "monumental" logistics and security workload problems.

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3. On balance, I feel that compatibility with the Headquarters IBM systems should not be the determiner and that the NPIC plan to upgrade from the UNIVAC 494 to a UNIVAC 1110 system should be endorsed. 1

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do agree that the points made by AD/OJCS and noted above should be pursued by NPIC and recommend that approval of dual processor 1110's be contingent upon further defense.

4. Given approval of this request, it will be necessary to resolve the hold on procurement placed by GSA due to a bidder complaint that CIA is not following the law, as stipulated in the Brooks Bill. Background on this and our current plan to attempt to obtain at least a partial exemption is contained in a Memorandum for the Record (Tab B). Logistics is producing a draft letter. If the Director does not want to seek a blanket exemption and GSA argues that the unclassified solicitation of bids obviates security arguments, we could claim, legitimately, that our action was undertaken in good faith in accord with the understanding we had had for the past five years. Or we could say that knowledge of acquisition of that specific model is unclassified but the applications it will support are among the most sensitive we have, that detailed discussion of the rationale for this particular selection would require special clearances and that the 1110 will be used in direct support, and as an integral part of, a major technical operations system.

[Redacted Signature]

Charles A. Briggs  
Chairman, Information Processing Board

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Attachments

Tab A - AD/OJCS comments dtd 28 Sep 73

Tab B - MOR fr C/IPB dtd 28 Sep 73

Tab C - Reference [Redacted] (Copy 9)

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28 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: GSA Query about Agency ADP Procurement Practice:  
Brooks Bill Exemption Question

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1. [ ] OL, informed me on 29 August that Log had been called by a Mr. Jay Rice, GSA/Automated Data and Telecommunications Service, with respect to NPIC's request for competitive bids for new ADP equipment. Some bidders allegedly were disgruntled and asked why the Agency didn't follow standard Government practice and procure ADP equipment thru GSA in accord with the Brooks Bill. Jim asked if our informal understanding re CIA exemption from standard practice was still in effect. I said, yes, that nothing had arisen to change the arrangement, but, it had been a good while and today's climate made it seem logical to reaffirm it. Jim said that he had discussed this subject with [ ] and that Doug was checking to see if NSA had an exemption. (They do have a formal, written exemption in a letter from the Administrator, GSA to the Secretary of Defense dated 30 December 1968.)

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2. I called Dwight Ink, Deputy Administrator, GSA, who seemed sympathetic to a CIA exemption, but said he'd check with his lawyers and his ADP staff, since Congressman Brooks is breathing heavily on GSA at the moment to fulfill their function under the law. Subsequently, I was called by Whit Dodson (George W. - Assistant Commissioner for ADP). He, too, sounded sympathetic on the phone. After stating that neither Fred Noble nor George Sweeney of GSA (from whom we had a continuing informal exemption since early 1968) had been authorized to grant the exemption, but that that was water over the dam, he suggested that it was time to formalize an exemption request, if we still sought one. As for the past, Dodson said, since Noble and Sweeney were GSA officials (now retired), it was legitimate for us to accept their oral exemption and act accordingly.

3. I suggested an in-house session with representatives from OJCS, Logistics and the General Counsel to determine whether we need and want to claim an exemption. The answer was affirmative



on both counts. Attending were [redacted] Iams, Van Damm and myself. It was decided that I would invite Dodson to come to Headquarters, see the OJCS facilities and talk with our procurement and ADP personnel. The intent was to demonstrate that current ADP procurement practice is consistent with the intent of the Brooks Bill--and goes it better. Also it was hoped that an appreciation of security problems in emanations, in ADP as an integral part of a sensitive collection system or otherwise in support of operations could be conveyed as a basis for a formalized request for exemption. (The NSA exemption was based on the "sensitive cryptologic systems" of which the procured ADP equipment would be a part--not, technically, a valid excuse in itself, according to the Brooks Bill.)

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25X1 4. Dodson and a Douglas A. Crone did come to Headquarters on 21 September. Involved on our side were Jack Iams of OJCS and [redacted] of Logistics, plus myself. They spent 1/2 hour or so in the OJCS computer center, then had considerable discussion on Agency procurement procedures and the security issues as we saw them. Neither gentleman had a security clearance on record, hence conversation was somewhat constrained, but not such that the basic points weren't articulated.

5. Dodson was quite friendly but noted that they took their responsibility under the law very seriously, not to be bureaucratic, but to be helpful. He felt that they were, daily, "in the kitchen" with many vendors and had experienced all kinds of variations which could help individual agencies negotiate the most effective contracts. He said it appeared that, indeed, we were using procedures in accord with their own; also that we had some equipment experience (particularly with the COMTEN) which would be valuable for them to know. He acknowledged that acquisitions for sensitive operational support should be exempt. However, he felt that general-purpose acquisitions, involving unclassified solicitation of bids, (like, he said, the current (NPIC) case) should involve GSA participation. That participation could come about in one of three ways: (a) awareness in advance, with authorization to CIA to proceed directly; (b) awareness, with permission to proceed, but with GSA "sitting on our shoulders"; (c) GSA procurement for us. The latter, Dodson said, occurred only about 5% of the time. With respect to open procurement, Dodson said we needn't fear that Agency acquisitions would appear in national data bases reflecting Federal Government ADP acquisitions. This, he said, could be fenced off. (We had indicated that our classified input to the ADP Management Inventory System was held by the International Affairs Division, OMB.)

6. The question of cleared personnel in GSA was raised, particularly in terms of turnover and the time it takes for full field clearances. Dodson said there were only [ ] involved in the whole procurement shop, turnover was very slow and perhaps only one or two needed clearance for Agency requests. Fleeting mention was made of possible detail of a GSA man to Logistics, or an exchange of personnel.

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7. I told Dodson we would try our hand at a draft letter requesting exemption; he asked to see it in draft to avoid either of us getting positions sunk in concrete too soon. I noted that the Director had not been read in on this and that it was possible that he might conclude that his legal responsibility for sources and methods protection would justify a total rather than partial exemption.

8. With respect to the (NPIC) current case which triggered this whole thing, Dodson noted that it was his understanding that at least one of the eight bidders on the RFP had asked why GSA had not been involved. He said that Crone's boss, Gould, had sent a letter to CIA telling us to hold up, pending resolution of the exemption status. Dodson suggested we float the procurement request up through the appropriate management channels. If it is blessed, he suggests we then take it up with him.

[ ]

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Charles A. Briggs  
Chairman, Information Processing Board

cc: D/OL  
AD/OJCS  
D/NPIC

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[ ] OCC

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